The House of Lords rejects amendments calling for safety measures for women, such as an in-person consultation before receiving medication by post to induce abortions outside a clinic.
The House of Lords has not made any significant changes to the law passed in June by the United Kingdom lower house (House of Commons), which fully decriminalised abortion, including when performed shortly before the baby’s due date.
Pro-life groups had hoped that two amendments tabled by conservative politicians and representatives of the Church of England (which has representation in the House of Lords) would be accepted. But this was not the case.
The House of Lords voted on Wednesday 18 March, with 185 against and 148 in favour, to reject an amendment to the bill that would have removed clause 206 – the part of the text that allows abortions beyond the legal limit of 24 weeks to no longer be considered a crime.
In effect, therefore, any abortion carried out outside a medical practice will go unpunished.
A second amendment was also rejected. It called for women to have at least one in-person consultation at a medical centre before carrying out an abortion elsewhere. It was defeated by 191 votes against to 119 in favour.
This means that, barring any surprises, the law decriminalising all forms of abortion up to birth will go ahead. The legal limit for having an abortion in healthcare centres will remain at 24 weeks, but there will be no consequences for those who have an abortion at home beyond that timeframe.
Pro-life groups such as Right to Life regard the law now set to be passed as the most significant change in these 60 years. “If this bill becomes law, it will likely lead to a significant increase in the number of women performing late-term abortions at home, endangering the lives of many more women,” said this group, which organises pro-life marches every year.
They believe the new law will also encourage abortions based on the baby’s gender, a practice which, according to a recent survey by Savanta ComRes, is rejected by 89% of the British population.
The Evangelical Alliance UK reacted to the vote with “deep concern” over the “bad news” coming from Westminster. If the law does come into force, the evangelical body added, it is necessary to “ensure that women facing crisis pregnancies receive compassionate, life-affirming support, and that both mother and child are cared for with dignity before and after birth”.
The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children regrets that this liberalisation of the abortion law has been “pushed through without any pre-legislative scrutiny, public consultation or a detailed impact assessment”.
They believe the new law “will lead to late-term abortions being carried out on babies who, if born in hospital, would stand a good chance of surviving”.
More abortion in Europe
Attempts to further liberalise abortion laws are also taking place in other European countries.
Upper-limit abortion legislation such as that currently being put forward in the UK is ultimately detrimental to the pro-life cause, warns John Smeaton, co-founder/co-director of Voice of the Family. Similar legislation is being considered in the South Australian parliament.
In my article last week, I explained how, nearly 40 years ago, British anti-abortion parliamentarians and campaigning organisations, including SPUC in which I had a leading role, paved the way for the catastrophic 1990 legislation which raised the upper limit for abortion to 24 weeks for most abortions in the UK while allowing abortions up to birth in cases of disability and for certain other reasons.
John Smeaton
The UK Government and parliamentarians were following the example set by the anti-abortion lobby, including by the Catholic bishops, which had backed David Alton’s1 Bill, published on 16 December 1987. The Alton Bill sought to introduce an upper limit of 18 weeks for most — so-called “social” — abortions, while permitting disabled babies to be killed up to 28 weeks.
The rationale for supporting Alton Bill-style legislation was presented in Human Concern, the flagship newspaper of the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (SPUC), of which I was general secretary, in these terms:
“SPUC will be stepping up its educational programme in the fight to win equal rights for the handicapped. The decision followed the results of the David Alton Bill in which an exception clause allowing abortion for severe handicap has been included.
“‘Of course we are continuing our support for the Bill’, said Phyllis Bowman, National Director. ‘It will save a considerable number of lives and will be the first step in the right direction.’” (My emphasis)
Tragically, it is more accurate to say that it proved to be a major step in the wrong direction.
Today, Right to Life UK is promoting another upper-limit bill which, if pursued, will result in similarly disastrous legislation. Support for exceptions for disabled babies is even more deeply entrenched in the parliamentary and public psyche and, as debates and votes in Parliament over the decades have demonstrated, politicians are likely to demand abortion up to birth for other reasons too.
The details of the bill backed by Right to Life UK have not been published but it’s reasonable to expect that it will be along the lines of one of two legislative measures which were under consideration in 2024, one proposed by Baroness Nuala O’Loan and the other by Sir Liam Fox MP. Both were backed by the Catholic bishops — with, no doubt, the same rationale as SPUC put forward in 1988, that they would be the “first step in the right direction”.
Both legislative measures expressly supported the killing of unborn children up to a certain number of weeks, while leaving in place abortion up to birth for disabled babies and for other reasons.
Baroness O’Loan’s Bill states: “In section 1(1)(a) of the Abortion Act 1967 (medical termination of pregnancy), for ‘twenty-fourth’ substitute ‘twenty-second’.
Parliamentarians backing Baroness O’Loan, therefore, would have been voting for the following provision to become part of the Abortion Act:
“1 (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person shall not be guilty of an offence under the law relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated by a registered medical practitioner if two registered medical practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good faith
“(a) that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-second week and that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family;
“Sir Liam Fox’s proposed new clause to the Criminal Justice Bill stated: “In section 1 (Medical termination of pregnancy) of the Abortion Act 1967, at the end of sub-subsection (1)(d) insert ‘provided that, where that chance arises from a foetus having Down syndrome, the pregnancy has not exceeded the gestational limit identified in sub-subsection (a).’”
Parliamentarians backing Sir Liam Fox’s measure, therefore, would have been voting for the following provision to become part of the Abortion Act:
“(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person shall not be guilty of an offence under the law relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated by a registered medical practitioner if two registered medical practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good faith—
“(a) that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family; or
…
(d) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped ‘provided that, where that chance arises from a foetus having Down syndrome, the pregnancy has not exceeded the gestational limit identified in sub-subsection (a).”
Both legislative measures were inviting parliamentarians expressly to support abortions on babies up to a certain number of weeks — 22 weeks in the case of Baroness O’Loan, and 24 weeks in the case of Sir Liam Fox — just as David Alton’s Bill, back in 1987, invited parliamentarians expressly to support abortions up to the 18th week of pregnancy. The Alton Bill stated:
“1 (1) A woman’s pregnancy may be terminated in accordance with section 1 of the Abortion Act 1967 at any time up to the beginning of the 18th week of gestation.
“(2) Thereafter, up to the 28th week of pregnancy … [for various reasons, including in the case of disability).”
The Catholic Church teaches that a law permitting the killing of certain unborn children is an unjust law which, in the words of St Thomas Aquinas, “ceases to be a law and becomes instead an act of violence”. Pope John Paul II in this connection, citing the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and its 1974 Declaration on Procured Abortion, said:
“In the case of an intrinsically unjust law, such as a law permitting abortion or euthanasia, it is therefore never licit to obey it, or to take part in a propaganda campaign in favour of such a law, or vote for it.”
The meaning of this statement quoted in Evangelium Vitae (no 73) is 100 per cent clear, and yet during the past fifty years, pro-life leaders, myself included, have backed legislation which permits abortion in certain circumstances on the basis that such legislation is an improvement on an existing law and will save lives.
However, such permissive anti-abortion campaigning sends the message to friends and opponents alike that abortion can be the right thing to do. Is it not likely that one of the reasons why the evil of abortion is so overwhelmingly accepted in particular circumstances by our fellow citizens, including by our fellow Catholics, is that pro-life groups themselves have almost universally been prepared to accept legalised abortion in certain circumstances?
Since 1995, many of us have justified our campaigns in support of unjust laws by quoting another paragraph in section 73 of Evangelium Vitae, where Pope John Paul II famously wrote:
“A particular problem of conscience can arise in cases where a legislative vote would be decisive for the passage of a more restrictive law, aimed at limiting the number of authorized abortions, in place of a more permissive law already passed or ready to be voted on … In a case like the one just mentioned, when it is not possible to overturn or completely abrogate a pro-abortion law, an elected official, whose absolute personal opposition to procured abortion was well known, could licitly support proposals aimed at limiting the harm done by such a law and at lessening its negative consequences at the level of general opinion and public morality. This does not in fact represent an illicit cooperation with an unjust law, but rather a legitimate and proper attempt to limit its evil aspects.”
For the past 30 years perhaps the majority of pro-life leaders have interpreted this paragraph as meaning that politicians may vote for, and campaigners may campaign for, laws which of themselves expressly permit abortions. But this is contrary to the teaching of the encyclical, as shown by the immediately preceding paragraph:
“In the case of an intrinsically unjust law, such as a law permitting abortion or euthanasia, it is therefore never licit to obey it, or to take part in a propaganda campaign in favour of such a law, or vote for it.”
According to Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, “the principle (or law) of non-contradiction is the firmest … without the principle of non-contradiction we could not know anything that we do know”. On the basis of this foundational principle of rational procedure, it is not possible for this statement to mean both one can vote for an unjust law and one cannot vote for an unjust law — on the basis of one’s motives in doing so or for any other reason.
Imagine it was lawful in our countries to kill children up to 6 months after birth. Imagine a parliamentarian putting forward legislation to stop the killing of children after three months, while authorising killings of children up to the three month limit — and with exceptions for disabled children who could be killed up to 6 months or even later. It would clearly be wrong to vote for such a law or to campaign for such a law, however many lives, allegedly, such a law would save, on the basis that it would be “a step in the right direction”.
Regarding exceptions for the abortion of disabled babies, Rachel Hurst, vice-chairman of Disabled People’s International, has said that pro-life groups which tried to stop social abortions but not eugenic abortions were being “extremely discriminatory and obviously show[ing] eugenic tendencies, even though they would refute them”. She argued that the lower status given to disabled unborn children reflected a view that “disabled people are not seen as human beings”.2 This was absolutely not the attitude or intention of David Alton or the Catholic bishops SPUC’s national director or myself back in 1987, but we must face the fact that the road to hell is paved with good intentions.
There is a crucial moral difference between, on the one hand, limiting, in an ethical way, the harm of pro-abortion legislation, such as we saw in the triumphant pro-life campaign to overturn the Roe v Wade decision; and, on the other hand, campaigning for politicians to vote for abortion in the case of rape, or in the case of disability, or in the case of a baby being below a certain number of weeks’ gestation. We will never defeat abortion by campaigning for politicians to vote for abortion in particular circumstances. As long as legislators accept that “it’s OK” directly to kill an innocent child in the womb, the defence against killing any unborn child is torn away.
by John Smeaton of Voice of the Family. Voice of the Family is an initiative of Catholic laity, formed to defend Catholic teaching on the family. Voice of the Family was founded in 2014 to offer our expertise and resources before, during and after the Synod on the Family 2014-15.
Voice of the Family is praying for Lord Alton who, last week, was being treated in hospital for injuries received in a road accident while on a bus in central London. ↩︎
Cited in Colin Harte, Changing Unjust Laws Justly (CUA Press, 2005) p 50. ↩︎
Viscount Fitzalan of Derwent gave this prescient speech to the House of Lords in London in 1939, in opposition to a bill put forward to legalise voluntary euthanasia.
Viscount Fitzalan of Derwent had given Notice that, on the Motion for the Second Reading, he would move, That the Bill be read 2a this day six months. The noble Viscount said:
My Lords, both the noble Lords who have spoken in introducing this Bill have alluded to the late Lord Moynihan, and I wish to do the same. I wish to associate myself with what they said with regard to the deceased Peer, whose loss we all deplore, and I do so especially because it was my privilege to be on terms of personal friendship with him, which I greatly valued, and of which I shall always bear a happy memory. I wish to allude to him also in respect of another point. He is reported as having said, in a speech which he made on this question, that denominations of Christians who were opposed to this measure ought to stand aside, and not to interfere with or inhibit those in favour of any measure of euthanasia. I must be allowed to say, with the greatest possible respect, that I absolutely and entirely repudiate any such suggestion. Why any of us who oppose this measure on account of our religious tenets should also be deprived of opposition to it on the ground of its merits, and also because we may consider it detrimental to the welfare of our country, I cannot conceive.
I entirely object to any such argument whatever. Of course the religious question comes in. It cannot be ignored. I myself shall endeavour in a few moments to say a few words with reference to the religious side of this question. I do so with great diffidence and with great hesitation. It is very difficult for a layman in this House to speak of matters on religious grounds, and I would ask the friendly sympathy of your Lordships when I endeavour to make a remark or two upon them. At the same time, for the moment I would venture to say a word or two on other provisions of this Bill. There are the very complicated provisions for the administration of the Bill if it ever becomes an Act. I have no doubt they will be alluded to by other speakers, and I will not take up your Lordships’ time by dwelling on them now, but would like to say that, notwithstanding the voluntary character of this Bill, if it became an Act I should be indeed sorry for the relatives of the patient, who would have great responsibility thrust upon them. I should be still more sorry for the doctors who would have placed upon them the responsibility of perpetrating the act; and I should be most sorry of all for the unfortunate patient, who would be exposed to the great mental strain and anxiety while all the formulas laid down by this Bill are being prepared for his demise.
It is quite true, as has been mentioned by the noble Lord opposite, that there is considerable weight of medical opinion in favour of this Bill, and he is fortunate in having here the two noble Lords, my noble friend Lord Dawson of Penn and my noble friend Lord Horder—if they are going to support this Bill. That I do not know. Whatever one does, I am certain the other will, because they always hunt in couples. But personally have never been rash enough to place myself under their professional care. I ought perhaps to hasten to admit that I have advised friends of mine to run the risk and, I think I may say, with more or less success. At the same time, notwithstanding the weight of medical opinion in this House, and outside it as well, in favour of the Bill, there is also a very great deal against. In my humble opinion the medical profession are very apt to be carried away by purely materialistic motives—naturally. They witness a great deal of pain and suffering and they are anxious to do all that can be done to alleviate it. But may I most respectfully point out to my two noble friends—if they are in favour of this Bill—that their business is to cure and not to kill, and I earnestly hope that the time may come when, with the advancement of science, of which I am sure they will take every heed, the alleviation of pain and suffering will be much greater than it is now.
Incidentally I should like to say that I cannot congratulate the noble Lord on the Title he has given to this Bill. Instead of giving it a cumbersome classical Title, I wish he had given it good plain English words, understandable by the people, and call the Bill what it is, a Bill to legalise murder and suicide, because, after all, that is what it amounts to. Many of your Lordships who have been interested in this question will have noticed that there have been many articles and letters in the Press on both sides of the question. The other day I came across a letter signed by an old country doctor—of forty years standing, he said. He was very critical of the Bill as a whole, but what struck me particularly in his letter was that he said we were getting too soft as a nation and too sensitive to pain. I have no wish to volunteer for any greater degree of pain or suffering than is likely to fall to my share, but I must say that when I read that letter I could not but feel that there was something in it; and when you think of the modern mania for luxury I cannot help thinking it is rather a warning to us against the danger of the degeneration of the race. I also noticed the other day that an eminent physician, a gentleman in the Civil Service, had expressed his opinion on euthanasia. He said that, even if it was voluntary, it was pregnant with criminal possibilities. I submit that we ought to be most careful in considering what the possibilities may be and the confusion that may arise if this Bill ever becomes law.
But now to return to the religious side of the question. It is quite true as regards my own faith that we are in an advantageous position in these matters, that owing to the teaching and authority of our Church we have certain safeguards and a guide and help in coming to a decision. But this is not entirely a matter for the Christian Churches. This Bill is not opposed only because it is condemned by the Church, it is not opposed only on Christian and moral grounds, it is opposed because it is contrary to the law of nature. We do not oppose it because the Church condemns it, but because the law of nature brands it as evil and a cowardly act. What about other people? What about the Jews? Are they in favour of this change? I am sure we all justly regard the Jews as being a humane race, but I am assured that there is not an orthodox Jew in the world who would not oppose this measure tooth and nail. What about the Mahomedans? Do they approve a measure of this kind? Not at all. They consider it to be contrary to the natural law and the law of God. Of course, if this question is to be considered, as I am sure it will not be by noble Lords in this House, as if there was no God, then the situation is different. Then we are driven back to being governed only by sentiment. Well, sentiment has its merits, and in many ways I think sentiment does much good. But if we allow it to run away with us, then it means an abandonment of principle, it means that we are governed by our emotions, and we sacrifice that great virtue of grit which has been such a great characteristic of our race.
This is no Party question. For generations the great majority of our predecessors in this House, of all creeds and all sections of opinion, have accepted the tradition that the Almighty reserved to Himself alone the power to decide the moment when life should become extinct. The noble Lord opposite comes down to-day with his Bill and asks us to usurp this right to ourselves, to ignore the Almighty in this respect, to insist on sharing this prerogative. I humbly submit that action of that kind partakes of the nature of an impertinence which we should do well to avoid, and I hope your Lordships will not allow the Second Reading of this Bill. I beg to move.
Second Reading of the Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill HL A speech against the proposed legislation by Viscount Fitzalan of Derwent House of Lords: Hansard (Westminster, UK), Vol. 101, November 4, 1936, columns 477–480.
About the speaker Edmund Bernard Fitzalan-Howard, 1st Viscount Fitzalan of Derwent (1855–1947) was a British Conservative politician. Before he was raised to the peerage, he served from 1894 to 1921 as a Conservative member of the House of Commons for the seat of Chichester in West Sussex. He later served briefly under Arthur Balfour as a Lord of the Treasury in 1905 and under H.H. Asquith and later David Lloyd George as Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury from 1915 to 1921 (jointly from December 1916 onwards). In 1918 he was sworn into the Privy Council. In 1921 he was appointed Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, the first Roman Catholic to be appointed to the position since 1685 during the reign of King James II. However, his tenure as Lord Lieutenant lasted only a year and a half. The post was abolished with the coming into existence of the Irish Free State and its constitution in 1922.
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